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CASE COMMENTS
idea of enchancement to confer liens on agisters, liverymen and garage-
men for their services. 26 The statutes also reflected a trend toward giv-
ing a possessory lien to an artisan for any work performed on the
chattel of another at the express or implied direction of the owner.
For example, the New York Lien Law26 bestows an artisan's lien on
"a person who makes, alters, repairs or in any way enhances the value
of an article of personal property .... " This statute does not limit the
artisan to a lien only for an increase in market value but extends to
any work performed at the request of the owner.
The early common law failed to consider the artisan whose work
did not increase the market value of the chattel. The courts, as in
Chicago Great W.R.R. Co. v. American McKenna Process Co.,27 rec-
ognized that market value was an arbitrary standard that excluded an
artisan merely because his work failed to enhance the value of the
product. In addition, the statutes generally have been constructed to
cover specifically those artisans who do any work on the chattel of
another, thus putting to rest the market value limitation.
DONALD WISE HUFFMAN
EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICY UPON REWARD OFFERS
An offeror of a unilateral contract may attach to the offer any terms
or conditions he desires. However, if public policy forbids the for-
mation of a binding contract, the offeror cannot impose a condition
having the effect of precluding judicial review. Reward cases are an
example of the type of situations where public policy considerations
are important.
The recent case of Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mathews' involves ten
claimants to a reward of $35,000. On June 20, 1g6o, the offices of the
Department of Motor Vehicles of West Virginia were entered and
$6o,ooo stolen. The Maryland Casualty Company offered a reward
for information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons per-
petrating the theft and for return of the money. Final determina-
tion of the persons entitled to the reward was left to a board of prom-
inent citizens. On July 8, 196o, Earl Mathews was arrested for the
'-37 Mich. L. Rev. 273 (1938).
21N.Y. Lien Lav § 18o (1951).
-2oo III. App. 166 (1916).
o209 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.W. Va. 1962).
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396 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
crime and pleaded guilty. After reviewing the claims to the reward, the
board awarded: $5,000 to Mrs. Mathews, wife of the thief;
2 $o,ooo
to Mrs. McIntyre, mother of a prosecuting attorney of Kanawha
County;3 and the remainder of $19,540.58 to Mr. Davis, full-time
salaried investigator of Kanawha County.
The unsuccessful claimants instituted actions against the Mary-
land Casualty Company who interpleaded all the claimants. Davis
moved to dismiss on the ground that the court did not have jurisdic-
tion. The court held that it did have jurisdiction, ruled that Davis
was ineligible to receive any of the money and decided to hear the
entire controversy anew.
Davis advanced two contentions in support of his claim to the
reward. First he stated that the district court was without jurisdiction
to hear this case. He based his claim on a term of the reward offer
which stated that the determination of a citizens committee should
be final. He also said his actions were outside the scope of the public
policy doctrine forbidding public officers to accept rewards since his
efforts were made during off-hours with the sole intent to recover the
reward.
The court rejected Davis' first contention since he was unable
to provide the necessary consideration to complete the contract. As
in the case of all contracts, a consideration is necessary to support a
contract based on the offer of a reward. The consideration support-
ing the promise of a reward is not the benefit to the promisor but
the detriment to the promisee. Performance of the terms of the offer
constitute sufficient consideration, but performance by one otherwise
bound to do so does not operate as sufficient consideration. 4 Davis
was not in a position to offer adequate consideration due to the nature
of his employment. In 1899, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Matthews5 recognized as well established the common law doctrine
based on public policy that an officer cannot receive a reward for the
performance of a duty which he is required by law to perform. The
court therefore had jurisdiction because the board's decision to grant
Davis a reward was contrary to law.
Davis' second contention failed irrespective of his intent or the fact
that he rendered such services on his own time since the services
2Memorandum on behalf of Grover T. Davis, Jr., in support of the allegations
that the claimants, Hildgarde Mathews and Mary Kathleen McIntyre are ineligible
to share in the proceeds of the reward, p. i.
31d. at 5.
'See 77 CJS Rewards § 13 (1952).5 173 U.S. 301 (1899).
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rendered by him were performed within his own territorial jurisdic-
tion, and, therefore, within the scope of his official duty. The rationale
underlying such a rule emanates from public policy. The classic case
demonstrating this principle is Somerset Bank v. Edmunds.6 Here
plaintiff brought suit for a reward for procuring the arrest of a bank
robber. The bank gave public notice of the reward. The plaintiff had
the necessary intention based on the offer, but the bank answered
that the plaintiff was precluded from recovery as he was the town
constable, bound to apprehend the criminal. The court held for the
defendant stating that such was his duty and responsibility and that
it would violate public policy to allow a reward or compensation in
addition to his salary. A constable making an arrest within his own
jurisdiction is presumed to act within the scope of his employment.
In re Russell,7 another leading case, involved a private citizen
whose home was burglarized. A reward was offered for information
leading to the apprehension of the guilty party. Several policemen on
their own free time obtained the information but were denied re-
covery because this was held to be within the scope of their official
duties. The public policy behind the holding was stated to be:
"[A] policeman might, without breach of official duty, with-
hold from his superior officers the information so obtained be-
cause it was obtained while he was 'off duty,' and might thus
shield criminals of the worst description from prosecution and
punishment .... A policeman who, whether on duty or off duty,
obtains, within the territorial jurisdiction of the police de-
partment, information which will lead to the conviction of the
perpetrators of crime therein, is bound, without other compen-
sation or reward than that given by the law, to communicate
it. ... To withhold such information would be a flagrant
breach of duty....,s
Over a period of years, there has been no deviation from the Rus-
sell doctrine.9 Davis' own testimony10 shows the wisdom of this doc-
076 Ohio St. 396, 81 N.E. 64, (1907). See Annot., ii L.R.A. (N. s.) 1170 (1907).
751 Conn. 577 (1884).
"Id. at 594, 595.
'Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Morris, 48 Okla. 8, 148 Pac. 1032 (1914), held that it
makes no difference that the claimant was not on duty since he was within his
jurisdiction. It further denied plaintiff's contention that to allow recovery would
spur officials to greater efficiency and effort. In Gray v. Martino, 91 N.J.L. 462,
103 At. 24 (i9i8), the plaintiff was a police officer in Atlantic City, N.J., and knew
of information concerning a robbery. He then learned of a reward but on the
ground of public policy was denied recovery.
There are other compelling reasons why this public policy doctrine is a sound
one. An investigator, through modern police methods and communication, would
398 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
trine. He admitted that he kept all his ideas and results to himself and
only divulged them to claim the reward. His employer, the prosecut-
ing attorney, said if Davis had received such information, he would
have been expected to disclose it to the investigating team.1
Some jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to this strict public
policy rule precluding a peace officer's recovery of a reward. 12 First, if
a constable arrests a fugitive from another state, he is not precluded
from recovering a reward offered in the other state. 13 A peace officer
owes a duty only to his own jurisdiction.' 4 When he performs
the required service in another jurisdiction,' 5 or enters another juris-
diction in pursuit of a criminal who committed a crime in his own
bailiwick, some courts will hold that he is entitled to a reward.' 6 A
nonpaid officer or special policeman may also be eligible to accept a
reward.17 The legislature by special act may either permit a public
officer to receive a reward,' 8 or relieve him of certain duties within his
have at his disposal better access to useful information than a member of the
general public. Also an informant might divulge information to a policeman when
he would be unwilling to do so for a person engaged in a private pursuit. The
Virginia case of Buek v. Nance, 112 Va. 28. 70 S.E. 515 (1911), demonstrates how
a policeman's position could be of advantage to him in gaining information.
The plaintiff was a jailer and had in his custody one charged with a jewel theft.
He obtained a confession but was denied recovery of a reward as his only right
of access to the culprit was through his public office.
202o9 F. Supp. at 827-28.
"Id. at 825.
"Under various fact situations, some cases have circumvented the technical
definition of the term "duty" to allow a public official to recover a reward in
spite of the recognized policy doctrine. 22 Wash. U.L.Q. 13o (1936).
",Where a murder occurred in Kansas, and the Oklahoma authorities cap-
tured the murder in their jurisdiction, they were held to be under no obligation
to do this, and therefore entitled to a reward. Board of Comm'rs of Montgomery
County v. Johnson, 126 Kan. 36, 266 P. 749 (1928); Collier v. Green, 2o5 Ky. 361,
265 S.W. 812 (1924).
'Marsh v. Wells, Fargo & Co. Express, 88 Kan. 538, 129 Pac. 168. See Annot.
43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 133 (1913).
15A Kentucky bankers association offered a reward for the apprehension of
anyone guilty of robbing any of its member banks. Cassady, a local sheriff, pursued
a person guilty of such crime into another state and effected his arrest. He was
held eligible to receive a reward. Kentucky Bankers Ass'n v. Cassady, 264 Ky. 351,
9,1 S.V.2d 622 (1936). Miners Wholesale Grocery v. Jennings, 98 Okla. 32, 224
Pac. 192 (1924).
"Kentucky Bankers Ass'n v. Cassady, 264 Ky. 351, 94 S.W.2d 622 (1936);
Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S.W. 532 (1915).
"1-Board of Comm'rs of Montgomery County v. Johnson, 126 Kan. 36, 266 Pac.
749 (1928); Smith v. Fenner, 1o2 Kan. 830, 172 Pac. 514 (1918); Elkins v. Board of
Comm'rs of Wyandotte County, 91 Kan. 518, 138 Pac. 578 (1914). Hartley v. In-
habitants of Granville, 216 Mass. 38, 102 N.E. 942 (1913).
"8Miss. Code Ann. §§ 8079, 8082 (1957), allow state highway patrolmen to par-
ticipate in statutory rewards, as they are said not to come under the definition of a
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own jurisdiction so as to make him eligible.19 The officer who per-
forms the duty before coming into or after leaving office may take the
reward.20 The noted exceptions have been applied only when the
officer is acting outside his jurisdiction or in certain instances when
he is under no duty to perform the service. None of these elements
were present in Mathews.
The principal case concerned only the eligibility of Davis to re-
ceive the reward. In redetermining the entire controversy, the court
will consider the claims of the other parties. Serious doubt must be
expressed as to the eligibility of Mrs. Mathews to participate in the
reward for two reasons: first, her information was not yielded volun-
tarily, and secondly, public policy should prevent the spouse of the
fugitive from benefiting from his crime.
Mrs. Mathews did not divulge her information concerning the
location of her husband until she was under police interrogation,
and this information was not given until one day before the arrest of
her husband. This was two weeks after the offer of the reward was
first made when she realized that her husband's capture was immi-
nent.21 Her disclosure then, can hardly be considered voluntary,
22
so there is no acceptance of the offer.
A recent District of Columbia decision is illustrative of this prin-
ciple denying a reward to a claimant who had not voluntarily ac-
cepted the reward offer. In Glover v. Jewish War Veterans,23 a mem-
ber of defendant's organization was murdered when his pharmacy
was burglarized, and the defendant offered a reward for information
leading to the apprehension and conviction of the guilty party.
peace officer. Smith v. Rankin County, 208 Miss. 792, 45 So. 2d 592 (195o). See also,
United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S. 381 (1899).
10In Kinn v. First National Bank of Mineral Point, 118 Wis. 537, 95 N.W. 969
(19o3), the powers and duties of the chief of police of Mineral Point were pre-
scribed by statute. It was not made his duty to arrest without process one wanted
for burglary, and hence, a chief who made such an arrest, within the limits of his
jurisdiction, is not precluded by his office from recovering a reward.
*Kentucky Bankers Ass'n v. Cassady, supra note 16.
2Memorandum on behalf of Grover T. Davis, Jr., pp. 1-2.
'Sheldon v. George, 132 App. Div. 47o, 116 N.Y.S. 969, 971 (19o9), involved
the theft of diamond earrings. The plaintiff bought the goods not knowing they
were stolen and only when threatened with legal process for their recovery, did
he agree to return them to the rightful owner. He then sought recovery of the
reward previously offered for their return. The court held "If the plaintiff re-
turned diamonds under compulsion .... then no contract exists, and no liability
of defendant to pay him the reward is created by the simple fact that defendant
received the diamonds from plaintiff." See cases collected in 77 C.J.S. Rewards, §
22 (1952).
T-68 A.2d 233 (D.C. Munic. Ct. of Appeals 1949).
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The plaintiff's daughter and the felon were romantically involved. The
police questioned the mother at her home. While under interrogation,
she admitted where the couple might be found, and they were sub-
sequently apprehended at this site. The mother was denied the re-
ward for two reasons: she did not know of the offer at the time she
divulged the information, and she did not give the information vol-
untarily.2
4
Secondly, Mrs. Mathews should be denied recovery on grounds of
public policy, since she was the spouse of the fugitive. This policy
rationale is based upon the premise that since the fugitive cannot
collect a reward for turning himself in,25 neither should his spouse
or a person closely connected with the fugitive benefit by complying
with the offer for reward.
"It is a maxim of the law that no man shall be permitted to
profit by, or take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity. [Citation omitted.] Under this
maxim, it has been uniformly held that a person who is con-
nected with an alleged theft,. .. cannot recover a reward .... ,,20
To allow a wife to recover for her husband's crime would open
the door to deceit and collusion. She might easily decide that her
husband is about to be apprehended, and therefore, divulge infor-
mation to salvage some monetary gain. This may be done in concert
with the husband who thinks arrest is imminent.
The court must on redetermination also consider the reward
granted to Mrs. McIntyre, whose son was a prosecuting attorney of
the county wherein the fugitive was apprehended. Serious doubt must
also be cast upon her eligibility to share in the reward. Although
there does not appear to be any authority precluding relatives of
public officers from sharing rewards, 27 it would seem to follow that the
rationale of Russell applies to relatives of public officials as well.
Again the door to deceit would open wide if all a policeman or
2LA police organization of the District of Columbia had also offered a re-
ward for information concerning the same crime. Again plaintiff was denied re-
covery for the same reasons as elaborated in the Jewish War Veterans case. Glover
v. District of Columbia, 77 A.2d 788 (D.C. Munic. Ct. of Appeals 1951).
23"Where a reward is offered for the apprehension or conviction of a criminal,
the criminal himself is not one of the public to whom the offer is addressed, and
he cannot by surrendering himself become entitled to the reward." i Williston,
Contracts § 7 4 A (3d ed. 1957). Board of Comm'rs of Clinton County v. Davis,
162 Ind. 6o, 69 N.E. 68o, (igo4). See Annot. 64 L.R.A. 780 (19o4).
'Id., 69 N.E. at 683.
-Mrs. McIntyre's son was a prosecuting attorney of Kanawha County, and
due to the nature of his public position, fell under the public policy doctrine
forbidding public officials to accept a reward.
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prosecutor had to do was to divulge information, obtained in his of-
ficial capacity, to his family who could in turn qualify for the reward.
This would lead to the conclusion that there are no eligible claim-
ants to the reward. Although the board found that the three recipients
had materially contributed to the capture of the fugitive and had there-
by complied with the -terms of the offer, the designated recipients
should be precluded on grounds of public policy. When the board
named three people to share in the reward, they impliedly found that
the other claimants had not performed the necessary service to warrant
sharing in the reward. It would impair .the offer of a unilateral con-
tract for the court now to declare otherwise. The court may prevent
the named persons from sharing in the reward on the grounds of pub-
lic policy, but the court should not find other persons' services sufficient
to constitute acceptance of the offer, as the fact finding agency designat-
ed by the offeror declared to the contrary. Therefore, there appear
to be no eligible claimants for the reward, which is perhaps as it should
be where the solution of crimes is involved.
JAMES A. GoRRY, III

